— Хуйловая Германия (@xui_de) October 19, 2014
— Хуйловая Германия (@xui_de) October 19, 2014
He now holds the 109th place with a fortune of $ 10.5 billion.
From the beginning, Akhmetov has lost 18% or $ 2.4 billion. Main drop fell on the last three months, that is the most active phase of the ATO in the East of Ukraine. Back in August, he was the ranking of the 88 th position with a capital of $ 12.8 billion. Certain role in this was played by the fall in commodity markets crisis – the state of the Indian Iron and Steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal is also decreased.
Forbes, a leading calculate your state capitalists, has not revised its rating. In May 2014, he assessed the state of Akhmetov’s $ 11.2 billion versus $ 15.4 billion in 2013.
Russian language original: http://hubs.com.ua/business/rinat-ahmetov-nemnogo-obednel.html
Before joining the European Union, each adopted laws on trade, judiciary, human rights. As a result, they became democracies. This was “democracy promotion” working as it never has before or since. . . .
This project is incorrectly “remembered” as the result of American “triumphalism” that somehow humiliated Russia by bringing Western institutions into its rickety neighborhood. This thesis is usually based on revisionist history promoted by the current Russian regime — and it is wrong.
For the record: No treaties prohibiting NATO expansion were ever signed with Russia. No promises were broken. Nor did the impetus for NATO expansion come from a “triumphalist” Washington. . . .
No NATO bases were placed in the new member states, and until 2013 no exercises were conducted there. A Russia-NATO agreement in 1997 promised no movement of nuclear installations. A NATO-Russia Council was set up in 2002. In response to Russian objections, Ukraine and Georgia were, in fact, denied NATO membership plans in 2008.
Meanwhile, not only was Russia not “humiliated” during this era, it was given de facto “great power” status, along with the Soviet seat on the U.N. Security Council and Soviet embassies. Russia also received Soviet nuclear weapons, some transferred from Ukraine in 1994 in exchange for Russian recognition of Ukraine’s borders. . . .
Why didn’t we move NATO bases eastward a decade ago? Our failure to do so has now led to a terrifying plunge of confidence in Central Europe. Countries once eager to contribute to the alliance are now afraid. A string of Russian provocations unnerve the Baltic region: the buzzing of Swedish airspace, the kidnapping of an Estonian security officer.
Our mistake was not to humiliate Russia but to underrate Russia’s revanchist, revisionist, disruptive potential.
Wouldn’t be the first time Moscow rewrote its history.
Irony serves as humor in Russia — it’s an extention of their profound nihilism. Everything is futile.
British humor is uniquely witty, connecting distant subjects in surprising ways. The more distant, the better. Is this a luxury of being island people?
German humor is sarcasm, shaming people into doing their duty.
Ukrainian humor, seems to be uniquely diminutive — applying the Ukrainian languages endless gradients of diminutives to surprising subjects or in surprising ways. I think it’s a coping mechanism for the difficult life which Ukrainians have long suffered.
Obama traveled to Ukraine with Sen. Dick Lugar in 2005 just seven months after he became a senator, touring surplus weapons stockpiles.
Most of the small arms and ammunition were left over when Soviets withdrew from Eastern bloc nations, and later dumped in Ukraine.
The two senators secured U.S. funding to help destroy the weapons instead of leaving them intact
Ukraine exported more than 700,000 small arms in 2004-2007, including 101,000 each to Libya and the UK, and 260,000 to the U.S.
But most of the ammunition stockpiles – crucial for keeping a standing army battle-ready – were destroyed.
Ukraine is in a staring match with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has designs on recapturing portions of the former Soviet nation.
Ugh. Agonizing literary interview.
How long will it be possible for censoring, dogmatic liberals to celebrate their victory over the censoring, dogmatic church via pornography? Isn’t it painfully obvious that the secular religion of post-modernism is guilty of all the same intolerance but without the excuse of being eugenic and civilization building.
By the spring of 1945 about 30,000 Lithuanians were actively fighting Soviet rule. Only in western Ukraine did the population rise up against the Soviets on a larger scale.
Someone just called my attention to this ridiculous video about Odesa:
That video is ridiculous. Most of the police department (to the horror of Ukrainians) donned red armbands and supported the pro-Russians. They weren’t hiding the fact as this “secret footage” claims.
This was widely reported to the horror of Ukrainians. The head of the Odesa police was quickly replaced after this incident.
So the fact that police protected hooligans is not evidence of they were a false flag. It was basically a repeat of the violent crackdowns on pro-Ukraine protests in Donetsk and Kharkiv except this time (finally) the Ukrainians fought back.
Sequence of events:
– The members of football clubs “Metallist” (Kharkiv) and Chernomorec (Odesa) announce a march for the “Unity of Ukraine”, which is to take place at 15:00, starting on the Sobornaya Square, and ending near the football stadium “Chernomorec”;
– 14:30: Pro-Russian activists gather near the Alexandrovskiy Prospectus. They wear marks, helmets and have shields, and are armed with sticks, bats and axes.
– Pro-Russian activists start marching towards the Sobornaya Square, while police makes weak attempts at stopping them;
– In the meantime, pro-Ukrainian activists are gathered on the Sobornaya Square. Having been warned about armed pro-Russian activists marching in this direction, self-defense of Maidan starts pulling up towards the Square from the side of Grecheskaya Street;
– Clashes commence between the football fans and the pro-Russian activists as the latter reach the Sobornaya Square;
– The street is covered in smoke. Police forms a 50 meters wide “neutral line” in between the pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian activists;
– Both sides start pulling cobblestones out of the roads;
– Pro-Russian activists start building barricades from trash containers and other nearby materials;
– Activists from the Emergency Moto-Assistance (no political affiliation) arrive and block the entries to the Grecheskaya Street. Shops on the neighbouring streets are closing;
– First casualties appear and ambulances start arriving;
– Pro-Russian activists armed with bats and Ьolotov cocktails make an entry;
– Pro-Russian activists start throwing Molotov cocktails. Police helps the pro-Russian activists by forming a “live shield” in front of them, who then start shooting from behind the policemen;
– The police eventually withdraw.
– The Pro-Russian were eventually routed and took shelter in the building. BOTH sides were throwing anything they could find at one another. Molotov cocktails were being thrown from the building as well as at it.
– Corrupt Odesa police release all the Russian organizers of the assault. In the following days.
Here’s footage of Ukrainian protesters saving the lives of people in the burning building: http://romaninukraine.com/ukrainians-saving-russian-invaders-in-o desa/
There’s plenty of evidence Odesa was, like Donetsk and Kharkiv, a preplanned attack on a pro-Ukrainian demonstration: http://romaninukraine.com/recording-thug-organizing-trip-to-odesa -for-may-8/
Mostly indicative of backwardness, Soviet-ness, sex, Chernobyl. :(
This is probably a goldmine for historians: http://www.unz.org/Pub/AmQSovietUnion
It seems to be mostly a propaganda journal, but one that presented scholarly views and official texts of government bodies.
I’ve just browsed briefly. The 1948 edition has an article about creating Jewish regions in Crimea and/or other parts of Ukraine.
And the territory of modern Lithuania was then called in another way: Samogitia or Zhmud. My ancestors called themselves Litvin, and their language – Lithuanian. Contemporary Belarus and Lithuania long time have been a unified country, our people share a common history. Even the Lithuanian capital Vilnius more than 600 years has been the Belarusian capital city of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Name of the city in those days was Vilna or Vilnia. Only in 1939 the Communists gave the city and the territory around to modern Lithuania. And if you ever read about ancient Lithuanian princes Mindovg, Vytautas, Gediminas, you must know: there are Belarusian princes too.
The name “Byelorussian” appeared only in the 19th century, when the land of my country went to the Russian Empire. Then Litvin was imposed on the new name of lands: Belorussia, and the people were called Belorussians. The name “Lithuania” departed to the northern part of the land. Now the modern state Lithuania located there.
And so people have become confused in terms of historical realities. This is understandable: Belarusians and Lithuanians are the neighboring peoples. We live together, Belarusians frequent Vilyunyus, go back to university, go shopping. Lithuanians are also frequent visitors to Belarus. For many centuries we have lived together in a single state whose name was the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.
Sean McMeekin. The Russian Origins of the First World War
n his third book in four years, Sean McMeekin, an assistant professor of international relations at Bilkent University (Ankara, Turkey), rekindles interest in Russia’s responsibility for unleashing the great catastrophe of 1914. Based on Russian, Turkish, French, German, Austrian, and British documentary repositories, including the Archive of Imperial Russian Foreign Policy (AVPRI) and the Russian State Military History Archive (RGVIA), the study forwards a courageous interpretation that stimulates interest in Russia’s path to war. Focusing on political designs and military events in the eastern theater, the book argues that the constellation of circumstances in July 1914 triggered Russian plans to overthrow and expel the Turks from Constantinople, extend dominion into eastern Anatolia and Persian Azerbaijan, and secure predominance in the Black Sea. While not entirely new, the thesis is told with vigor and boldness, based on fresh AVPRI findings. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov appears center stage as the astute and charming, yet shallow and deceitful mastermind behind an intricate manipulation of British and French foreign policymakers to secure Russia’s bid for world power. . . .
In evaluating the reasons that Russia opted for war, McMeekin diminishes the symbolic interest of the Bosnian Crisis of 1908. He dismisses its memory “in the minds” of Russian statesmen. He pays scant attention to Russia’s fragile domestic morale and the influence of the popular press. Yet after Russia’s ignominious bow to Austrian and German threats in 1909, Russia’s political and military elite believed that Russia could not sustain yet another humiliation on that scale.
The absence of discussion about the archduke’s assassination in a handful of diplomatic papers does not conceal the deep-seated concern for Balkan affairs. The matter in Serbia was not “some silly Balkan bagatelle” or “phantom issue” to the Russian Foreign Ministry (pp. 101, 232). If Russia remained passive in the face of the destruction of Serbia, it would be humiliated and its long-held prestige among the Slavic peoples of southeastern Europe would dwindle into insignificance. The Russian ministers feared that the domestic results of such a fiasco would be incalculable. Action entailing major sacrifices would be better than skulking away in shame. McMeekin’s inspection of the July record rests on ample speculation over a few consular reports, incomplete diaries, and self-proclaimed insights into the “actors’” minds. Absent from the war plans and consular papers employed are the enormous, astoundingly complex details behind a descent on the Turkish capital and its effect on millions of people.
An emphasis on the drama of the Russian Revolution has diminished historians’ appreciation for events directly connected to the eastern theater of the war. Building on the work of Norman Stone, the central chapters of The Russian Origins of the First World War provide a brief narrative of Russian military action in the eastern front, including the southern Caucasus, Anatolia, and Persian Azerbaijan. In the opening month of the war, Russia’s infantry-divisional advantage coupled with Austria’s botched mobilization enabled tsarist forces to score major victories in the Southwest. . . .
There is a tiny kernel of truth in McMeekin’s analysis; since Sazonov’s time, the Russian General Staff had maintained that mobilization was the equivalent of war. General mobilization was consequently a bellicose act directed at both German states. Yet time was a prized commodity and the Russian leadership had no reason to postpone the inevitable. Austria’s declaration of hostilities against Serbia indicated that war was at hand. Most Russian leaders believed the war would be short, and key figures among the military and civilian elite were acutely aware of Russia’s unpreparedness. Russia’s strategies for war were dependent on incomplete, hastily conceived plans and tense cabinet meetings chaired by all too human actors, not a cohesive strategy for the Ottoman inheritance.
The Ukrainian Interior Ministry’s Dnipro-1 battalion has eliminated a Russian subversive group, a terrorist nicknamed Chechen and a Russian general, the National Defence Headquarters of Dnipropetrovsk Region has reported, the Interfax-Ukraine news agency reported at 16:09 Kyiv time.
It said that the Dnipro-1 fighters had carried out a special operation in Telmanove, a town southeast of Donetsk, in the early hours of 9 October. As a result of the operation, terrorist Andrey Borisov (Chechen) and three Russian military were killed.
“Russian general Sergey Andreychenko is among the killed,” the report reads.